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I.

Introduction
As part of the design of its future building, the University of Tennessee nuclear

engineering department intends to incorporate a variety of nuclear engineering and nuclear
science laboratories to advance the department’s research, as well as its educational capabilities.
Included in these intended laboratories are a wet chemistry laboratory, materials characterization
laboratory, linear accelerator facility, physical security laboratory, critical experiment facility,
and more. For our group’s senior design project, we were tasked with designing a facility or
group of facilities that could house the future linear accelerator, neutron generator, and
irradiation area. Beyond this general description, our facility must be able to stand up to the
usage needs for the department, provide adequate shielding to protect the users and general
public, be cost effective, and provide the potential for future upgrades. Each one of these tasks
provide their own design challenges. When combined, these tasks create a project environment
that allows for a wide range of engineering skills to be tested (project management, drafting,
dose calculations, computer simulations, etc.).
Outside

Hallway
Figure 1: Initial room layouts provided by the nuclear engineering faculty, showing possible
facility placement and room geometries.
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Shown in Figure 1 are the critical facility/graphite pile, physical security research
laboratory, and accelerator room (along with additional departmental facilities). The linear
accelerator facility will include the 9MV Varian materials linear accelerator and accelerator
control room. The physical security laboratory will include an irradiation area with high bay
doors to allow for truck access. The critical experiment facility will include a NASA critical
experiment, graphite pile, and DT neutron generator. These three laboratories are interconnected
in their usage and will be physically connected with conduits through which radiation will be
directed for imaging, materials characterization, amongst other usages.
From the geometrical layout (Figure 1) provided by the department, we had to adapt the
facility design to further suit the needs of the individual faculty members and provide a shielding
analysis for the design. This adaptation consisted of considering known design parameters and
anticipating design parameters that could easily change. These design parameters included: the
allotted size of facilities, the energy of linear accelerator, the possible addition of a DT neutron
generator, the space needed for experiments, the type of experiments, and more. A majority of
the design process was devoted to weighing these considerations and creating a layout to best
suit facility needs. To provide a more robust facility, we decided to shield for a higher energy
linear accelerator, a 22 MV linear accelerator that could be bought at a later time. By shielding
for this higher energy linear accelerator, we will take into account the lower energy radiation of
the 9 MV linear accelerator, while limiting the amount of retrofitting that would need to be done
with the implementation of future upgrades.
The shielding analysis was done in as two part calculation method. The first being an
analytical solution based on regulation guidelines set by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) and the state of Tennessee and described in detail by the National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements (NCRP) reports 144 [2] and 151 [3] (auxiliary support for the
analytical NCRP methods was taken from McGinley’s Shielding Techniques for Radiation
Oncology Facilities [1]). The second being an MCNP simulation of the floor plan (Figure 2,
derived from the NCRP methods) and source. From the simulation, doses in occupied spaces
were determined. These doses were then compared against governing regulations to verify that
dose limits were not exceeded.
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Figure 2: CAD drawing of intended room layout for the
accelerator and physical security research facilities after
initial calculations were done with the NCRP methods.

Due to the complexity of the project, certain aspects had to be given more attention. The
way this was decided on was based on the likelihood of events and the time that each task
required. For the project, we chose to focus primarily on designing the facilities to allow the use
of the primary radiation source, the 22 MV linear accelerator, as well as accounting for the
special requirements that our departmental faculty requested. These tasks were given precedence
over shielding for the neutron generator because of the certainty that the linear accelerator
facility will be part of the future nuclear engineering building, whereas the neutron generator is
an intended addition that would require additional shielding to be taken into account in the
graphite pile/critical experiment facility and physical security laboratory. Our floor plan takes
into account the neutron generator’s utilization with respect to the physical security laboratory,
but a set of dose calculations through the use of NCRP analytical calculations and MCNP
simulations will not be done at this time. In the “Future Works” section, we will address the next
steps needed to be taken including: simulation considerations, possible floor plan modifications,
amongst others. Throughout the duration of the project, the floor plan has continually developed;
creating a group of facilities that could be a valuable addition to the future departmental building
of the University of Tennessee, Department of Nuclear Engineering.
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In this report, we will provide an account of the methods that were used in the design of
the combined physical security and linear accelerator facility, a comparison of the methods,
design considerations, a description of the calculations undertaken, a summary of results, a
conclusion of the project, along with future works that need to be taken into consideration. The
report is intended to serve as a reference for faculty members as they undertake the design of the
new nuclear engineering building.
II.

Technical Approach
a. NCRP methods
Reports 144 and 151 of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements

present recommendations and shielding calculation methods to aid in the shielding design of
megavoltage (MV) x-ray and other radiation facilities. These reports offer recommendations that,
if used correctly, should adequately meet the currently accepted standards of radiation protection.
The purpose of these documents is to offer those performing a shielding analysis, a standard way
to analytically calculate an effective amount of shielding. This shielding is split into several
different categories: primary barriers, secondary barriers, mazes, and doors.
Primary barriers are the barriers on which the primary beam is incident on. It is these
barriers that the most intense radiation is incident, thus they are almost exclusively the thickest
barriers of a facility. Primary barrier width must be at least the size of the primary beam on the
barrier plus an additional foot on each side1. Medical linear accelerator facilities are generally
smaller in their footprint, when comparing them to the facility that we are considering. This is
due to the space needed in these facilities to accomplish their intended tasks. For medical linear
accelerator facilities, this is to treat patients with radiation. For facilities such as ours, the tasks
are varied and unpredictable. Thus there is a need for a larger source to surface distance, and
consequently a wider primary barrier.
Secondary barriers are all other barriers that radiation is incident on, whether that be
through scattering events, from accelerator head leakage, or from secondary radiation. Shielding
doors are typically a continuation of secondary shielding that allows radiation workers to have
access to the radiation areas. Shielding doors, depending on the materials chosen, can be large
(both in size and weight). To reduce the size of shielding doors, mazes can be used. Mazes are
secondary barriers placed between the beam and access doors. Mazes limit the pathways of
radiation from reaching areas to be protected, specifically these access doors. However, due to
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the need of hallways and the additional shielding of the maze, this adds considerable square
footage to a facility design. It is up to each facility to determine the layout which works best for
them.
Shielding is typically calculated utilizing radiation’s intrinsic

1
𝑟2

dose fall off and

negative exponential attenuation. Due to the dependence of attenuation on materials, this does
not lend itself to a general shielding calculation. For a simplified, more general shielding
calculation, a set of transmission factor equations was developed to establish the necessary tenth
value layers and consequently barrier thicknesses. This set of transmission factor equations is
described in detail in both NCRP 144 and 151. Each barrier type has its own transmission factor
formula with appropriate variables including but not limited to: shielding design goal, distance to
be protected, workload, use factor, and occupancy factor. These equations and variables, are
based on experience and expected operation; taking into account the amount of radiation that will
be incident on barriers and the length of time that individuals will be beyond the barrier in
question. These calculations and parameters used within these calculations can be seen in section
III.b.ii.
The methods described in the NCRP reports are the methods relied upon by health
physicists, medical physicists, and radiation specialists. If the correct formulae are chosen and
the correct variables are applied, the calculated thicknesses will be an overestimate for the
required radiation shielding. However, the factors chosen in the transmission factor formulae
dictate the quality of your shielding, if the variables chosen do not take into account the full
extent of the radiation, the calculated thicknesses will potentially be inadequate.
b. MCNP approach
MCNP (Monte Carlo N-Particle code) is a Monte Carlo code, which uses the Monte
Carlo method for solving transport problems for nuclear engineering and other nuclear science
problems. MCNP was first released in 1977, and was derived from work done at Los Alamos [4].
The version used in this project was MCNP5, which is accompanied by MCNP6 and MCNPX
and is an export controlled software distributed by Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) and the
Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC).
The main function of MCNP is to solve transport problems. This is stated in the MCNP
references (X-5, Volume I: Overview and Theory and Volume II: User’s Guide) [4,5]. One of the
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reasons that this code was developed is to help solve the complex transport equations used in the
nuclear sciences. This code is used extensively in the nuclear engineering field to solve complex
transport problems in nuclear reactors; however, its capabilities lend themselves to a variety of
aspects in the nuclear sciences, including: health physics, medical physics, detection, and
spallation activities.
This code offers a statistical representation of particle transport within materials,
interactions of the incident particles, secondary particle generation, secondary particle
interaction, and other transport information that would be difficult to observe and calculate
without the computational power that this Monte Carlo code harnesses.
MCNP input is a three part text document consisting of cells, surfaces, and data. Each
section works with the others to create a cohesive model of a source, geometry, and detector to
allow for the simulation of particle transport. In the surface section, geometrical boundaries
(planes, cylinders, spheres, etc.) are placed within the “MCNP workspace”. Alone, these
boundaries serve no purpose, but used together these boundaries are what are used to define
cells, the building blocks for a transport geometry. Cells are the physical spaces in which
particles are transported. The particle transport is governed by information contained within the
data of the input. Here, materials, sources, tallies, conversions, and other data cards can be
implemented. These data cards, when acting on the cells, allow for representative transport of the
particles of interest.
For shielding analysis, the geometry of interest, when tested through simulation, should
show the required dose limits are met. For this to be done accurately; the geometry, source, and
detectors must all be created to offer a representative reality for simulation.
c. Comparison of Methods
The NCRP analytical calculations and MCNP simulations were performed for different
reasons. The methods described in the NCRP 144 and 151 reports offer a generalized way to
calculate the necessary shielding based on a set of user specified coefficients and objectives. The
NCRP analytical calculations are extremely useful if the extend of the radiation is known and
consistent. Whereas, MCNP performs a complex particle simulation based on a specific
geometry, utilizing tallies to find doses at a given location.
The NCRP analytical method provides transmission factors that can then be turned into
the number of tenth value layers to achieve the specified dose limit. From the number of tenth
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value layers, a barrier thickness of a desired material can be calculated. The advantage of using
the NCRP analytical methods is that it is allows the user to input those parameters that apply to
their individual facility, including: how long the beam is on in a given week, how long people
will be occupying adjacent facilities, how long the beam will be directed at a given wall, distance
from beam to area to be protected, beam energy, amongst others. Given the appropriate
parameters and the appropriate equations, the NCRP analytical methods give the user a simple,
quick way to determine shielding thicknesses for radiation facilities. The disadvantage of using
the NCRP analytical methods is that the method has an intrinsic overestimate of shielding. This
overestimate of shielding is beneficial for ensuring the safe operation of a facility; however,
more shielding translates into a higher construction cost.
The MCNP simulations are particle simulations based off of a representative geometry of
the facility in question. Unlike the general NCRP analytical method, the MCNP is a highly
specific simulation that tracks both primary and secondary radiation through the specified
geometry. The advantage of an MCNP simulation is in the accuracy of the calculation.
However, this accuracy is a double edged sword. For the simulation to yield relevant results, a
geometry and source term must be supplied that is representative enough of the actual facility
and linear accelerator. The facility geometries can be fairly easily recreated in MCNP. And using
resources such as the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Compendium of Material
Composition Data for Radiation Transport Modeling [6], the geometry can be created using the
representative materials. It is the linear accelerator source term that can cause the error in dose
results. If the source term is not modelled correctly, any dose results obtained from simulations
will be subject to any differences between the simulated and actual accelerator. Thus it is
paramount that any MCNP simulation run to verify that dose limits are not exceeded must be
performed with the utmost care and by those with sufficient shielding and simulation experience.
III.

Computational Methods
a. Design Considerations
The goal of this project was to create a viable shielding option for a 22 MV linear

accelerator and DT neutron generator. Due to time constraints, the shielding analysis was only
verified for the linear accelerator; however, the design takes into account its implementation into
the facility and offers margins in the floor plan for additional neutron shielding. Starting from the
faculty suggested room layout seen in Figure 1, we had to decide which modifications to make to
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the design that would best utilize the approximate 2000 sqft area. We started by talking with the
faculty members that would be primarily involved in the usage of the room. From talks with
faculty, it became evident that the facility design would need to be heavily altered.
Due to the nuclear engineering department’s imaging and nonproliferation interests, the
faculty has asked that the new physical security and linear accelerator facilities be designed such
that large objects, such as shipping containers, can be brought into the facilities and imaged
using an Eagle Portal imaging system. To allow for the large containers to be brought in, we
decided to utilize a large direct access door measuring 16 ft high and 3.5 ft thick. The doorframe
has a 15 ft clearance, that would allow for trucks to drive into the facility and be unloaded using
a crane attached to the facility’s ceiling. To allow for the movement of the large cargo and the
inclusion of a cargo crane, the ceiling of the facility also had to be of sufficient height. It was
decided to use a 20 ft ceiling for both the linear accelerator and physical security facilities.
Other requests by the faculty included the utilization of a collimation wall between the
accelerator and physical security facilities. This collimation wall is a 3 ft thick wall with a 2 ft x
2 ft square conduit centered laterally and located between 3 ft and 5 ft vertically. It was
positioned laterally as to weigh lessen the leakage radiation on the outer wall (uncontrolled) and
weight it more heavily toward the control room wall (controlled). It was placed between 3 ft and
5 ft vertically as to create a realistic and useable accelerator height. The point of the collimation
wall is to provide a place to add additional beam shaping devices on either side of the wall, such
as lead collimation plates. As for the thickness of the collimation wall, it was decided on so that
if the accelerator is placed directly adjacent to the collimation wall, only the photons created
outside of the 15 degree off-axis primary beam would be collimated.
From here, given the size limitations that were provided, we created areas to be protected.
We attached occupancy factors, workloads, and relevant distances to each barrier. With these
factors we calculated transmission factors and consequently barrier thicknesses. These
calculations are in the following section (NCRP analytical calculation methods). After these
calculations were performed, an MCNP simulation on the finalized geometry was performed to
verify the shielding. A to-scale drawing of the facilities can be seen in appendix b.
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b. NCRP analytical calculation methods
i. NCRP assumptions
The analytical methods described in NCRP reports 144 and 151 are intended for the use
in shielding calculations for medical linear accelerators (NCRP 151) and various particle
accelerators (NCRP 144). For the shielding calculations that were needed for this atypical
project, certain assumptions had to be made including: the appropriate equation modifications,
correct occupancy factors, necessary workload, limiting dose rates, and other factors.
First, the decisions on which equations to use for the calculations had to be made. The
bulk of the reference shielding materials was about medical linear accelerator shielding. Each
reference, although similar, handled their variables slightly differently and were based on various
assumptions. For the final calculations, equations were drawn from both reports [2,3], as well as
from McGinley’s Shielding Techniques for Radiation Oncology Facilities [1]. The chosen
equations can be found below under the NCRP calculations heading (Equations 1-3).
Next were the decisions about equation variables, namely: occupancy factors, workload,
and limiting dose rates. Occupancy factors (fraction of time that an area will be occupied during
a given week) were decided upon by the type of area that was to be protected and ranged from
1/20 for low traffic areas to 1 (full occupancy) for uncertain or possibly high traffic areas. With
the occupancy factor decisions, caution was taken to over shield rather than under shield. Work
load (amount of dose delivered to the isocenter during a given week) was decided to be 1000
Gy/week for our accelerator facility. This number is higher than the 500-600 Gy/week
recommended for typical facilities [2] because of the uncertainty in the amount of usage that the
facility would get during a typical or atypical week. Finally, dose limits were assigned to barriers
based on the occupants that could pass by or reside in the area beyond that barrier. These dose
limits were taken to be 0.1 mSv/week for controlled areas and 0.02 mSv/week for uncontrolled
areas and are based on NCRP recommendations and governing regulations [2,3,7].
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ii. NCRP calculations
1. Primary Barrier Calculations [3]
Bpri =

2
𝑃𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑖

𝑊𝑈𝑇

(1)

Equation 1: Primary barrier transmission taken from NCRP 151 pg. 22 [3].
Bpri = Transmission factor for the primary barrier
P = Shielding design goal (expressed in dose equivalent) beyond the barrier and is usually given
for weekly time frame (Sv/week)
dpri = Distance from the X-ray target to the point protected (m)
W = Workload or photon absorbed dose delivered at 1 m from the x-ray target per week
(Gy/week).
-

For medical accelerators, isocenter is assumed or calibrated to be 1 m. For the materials
linear accelerator, the isocenter is not established. For the project, we assumed the
irradiation material would be placed in the center of the room, approximately 15-16 ft
away from the accelerator.

U = Use factor or fraction of the workload that the primary beam is directed at the barrier in
question.
T = Occupancy factor for the protected location or fraction of the workweek that a person is
present beyond the barrier. This location is usually assumed to be 0.3 m beyond the barrier in
question.
Table 1: Primary barrier
transmission factor calculations
T
0.6
W
1000
Gy/week
37
Ft
dpri
11.28
M
U
1
P
0.0001
Sv/week
Bpri
0.0000212
n
4.67
214.82
cm
tbar
7.05
ft
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In the primary barrier calculations, we had to consider factors relating to the critical
facility. We assumed a conservative occupancy factor of 60% of the work week. This would take
into account students or faculty working for a majority of the week in the facility. We also
assumed a conservative workload of 1000 Gy/week. This workload is twice the workload
recommended by the NCRP reports 144 and 151. The critical facility is also a radiation
environment, thus we assumed it would be a controlled area, assigning it a dose limit of 0.1
mSv/week. Finally we determined a distance for the area to be protected. Based on these
parameters, a transmission factor was determined using equation 1. From the transmission factor,
the number of tenth value layers and barrier thicknesses can be determined. For our primary
barrier, we used a 7 ft thick concrete wall.
2. Secondary Scatter Calculations [2]
T(x) =

𝐻𝑚 (𝑑𝑖 𝑑𝑠 )2

𝐴𝑊𝑇

Equation 2: Scatter transmission factor taken from NCRP 144 pg. 193-5 [2].
T(x) = Transmission factor for the shield barrier
Hm = Maximal permissible dose-equivalent rate for the type of area (Sv/week)
di = Distance to incident of scatter (m)
ds = Distance from scatter to area to be protected (m)
 = Differential dose albedo ()
-

For our shielding analysis, we assumed a differential dose albedo of 5x10-3 [2].

A = Beam area of the scattering surface (m2)
W = Workload or photon absorbed dose delivered at 1 m from the x-ray target per week
(Gy/week).
T = Occupancy factor for the protected location or fraction of the workweek that a person is
present beyond the barrier. This location is usually assumed to be 0.3 m beyond the barrier in
question.

(2)
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Table 2: Secondary scatter
calculations for the hallway
adjacent to the facilities
T
0.2
W
1000
Gy/week
H
0.0001
Sv/week
17
Ft
di
5.18
M
A
6.1
m2
22
Ft
ds
6.71
M
alpha
0.005
T(x) or Bs
0.020
n
1.700
81.02
cm
tbar
2.66
ft

Table 3: Secondary scatter
calculations for the large direct
access door
T
0.05
W
1000
Gy/week
H
0.00002 Sv/week
17
Ft
Di
5.1816
M
A
6.1
m2
17.3
Ft
Ds
5.27304
M
Alpha
0.005
T(x) or Bs 0.009862
N
2.006043
94.77
cm
Tbar
3.11
ft

Table 4: Secondary scatter
calculations for wall adjacent to
direct access door
T
0.05
W
1000
Gy/Week
H
0.00002
Sv/week
17
ft
di
5.1816
m
A
6.1
m2
13.8
ft
ds
4.20624
m
alpha
0.005
T(x) or Bs 0.006275
n
2.202377
103.607
cm
tbar
3.399178
ft

Table 5: Secondary scatter
calculations for ceiling of physical
security room
T
1
W
1000
Gy/Week
H
0.00002 Sv/week
17
Ft
Di
5.1816
M
A
6.1
m2
20.25
Ft
Ds
6.1722
M
Alpha
0.005
T(x) or Bs 0.000676
N
3.170315
147.1642
cm
Tbar
4.828221
ft

Secondary barriers are calculated using both secondary scatter and leakage radiation
components. For the secondary scatter calculations, we focused on those walls that are beyond
the collimation wall. This was done because the primary beam is directed through the radiation
conduit. If radiation backscatters off a surface and back through the collimation wall, its impact
on further shielding would be of a lower magnitude than leakage. Thus any major component of
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secondary scatter will be restricted to areas beyond this conduit. The four major barriers that
were calculated using secondary scatter equations were the large direct access door adjacent to
the outside, the wall accompanying the large direct access door adjacent to the outside, the wall
adjacent to the hallway, and the ceiling.
For calculation purposes we assumed that the ceiling and outside were uncontrolled areas
(0.02 mSv/week), while the hallway was a controlled area (0.1 mSv/week). The hallway was
considered controlled due to the multiple radiation facilities on the leve; if someone is going to
be around these facilities, they should be badged and monitored. Occupancy factors ranged from
5% to 100%. We assumed lower occupancies in transient areas and full occupancy in the area
above, due to the uncertainty in what is going to be placed above. We assumed that scattering
events would take place in the middle of the irradiation facility, along the central axis of the
beam.
From these calculations, we obtained shielding thicknesses needed to protect against the
secondary scatter radiation. These barrier thicknesses corresponded to concrete walls of: 2.7 ft
for the hallway, 3.1 ft for the large direct access door, 3.4 ft for the outside wall, and 4.8 ft for
the ceiling. However, these barrier thicknesses only take into account one secondary radiation
component. Secondary leakage also needs to be considered in final barrier thicknesses.
3. Secondary Leakage Calculations [3]
BL =

𝑃𝑑𝐿2
10−3 𝑊𝑇

(3)

BL = Transmission factor for the shield barrier
P = Shielding design goal (expressed in dose equivalent) beyond the barrier and is usually given
for weekly time frame (Sv/week)
dL = Distance travelled by leakage radiation
W = Workload or photon absorbed dose delivered at 1 m from the x-ray target per week
(Gy/week).
T = Occupancy factor for the protected location or fraction of the workweek that a person is
present beyond the barrier. This location is usually assumed to be 0.3 m beyond the barrier in
question.
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Table 6: Secondary leakage
calculations for outside wall
T
0.05
W
1000
Gy/week
P
0.00002
Sv/week
13.8
ft
dL
4.20624
m
BL
0.007077
n
2.1501519
101.25684
cm
tbar
3.3220747
ft

Table 7: Secondary leakage
calculations for control room
T
0.666667
W
1000
Gy/week
P
0.0001
Sv/week
12
ft
dL
3.6576
m
BL
0.002007
n
2.697516
125.8882
cm
tbar
4.130191
ft

Table 8: Secondary leakage
calculations for wall behind
accelerator
T
0.13
W
1000
Gy/week
P
0.0001
Sv/week
26.5
ft
dL
8.0772
m
BL
0.052193
n
1.282388
62.20748
cm
tbar
2.040928
ft

Table 9: Secondary leakage
calculations for ceiling in
accelerator room
T
1
W
1000
Gy/week
P
0.00002
Sv/week
20.25
ft
dL
6.1722
m
BL
0.000762
n
3.11809
144.8141
cm
tbar
4.751117
ft

Along with secondary scatter, secondary leakage radiation must also be considered when
defining shielding thicknesses. For secondary leakage components, we focused on those walls
behind the collimation wall, in the direction opposite the primary beam. Leakage radiation comes
off of the accelerator head, we assumed that any forward directed leakage radiation would be
absorbed or greatly reduced by the collimation wall. Limiting the major leakage radiation
shielding components to the outside wall adjacent to the accelerator room, wall behind the
accelerator, accelerator control room wall, and ceiling.
For calculation purposes, we assumed that the room behind the accelerator and control
room were controlled areas (0.1 mSv/week) and that above the ceiling and outside were
uncontrolled areas (0.02 mSv/week). We assumed occupancy of 13% for the room behind the
accelerator, 67% for the accelerator control room, 5% for outside, and 100% for the area above
the ceiling.
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From these calculations, we obtained shielding thicknesses needed to protect against the
secondary leakage radiation. These barrier thicknesses corresponded to concrete walls of: 2.1 ft
for the room behind the accelerator, 4.1 ft for the control room, 3.3 ft for the outside wall, and
4.8 ft for the ceiling. However, these barrier thicknesses only take into account one secondary
radiation component. Secondary scatter, calculated above, also needs to be considered in final
barrier thicknesses.
4. Tenth Value Layers [3]
n = - log(B)

(4)

Based on transmission factors obtained from Equations 1-3, the number of tenth value layers
(TVL) required to reach the specified dose limits can be determined using Equation 4.
5. Barrier Thicknesses [3]
tbar = TVL1 + (n – 1)TVLeq

(5)

Once the necessary tenth value layers are found, barrier thickness can be determined based on
tenth value layers of the target shielding material. For photon shielding, the main shielding
material for primary and secondary barriers is concrete. Tenth value layers vary from reference
to reference. For our shielding analysis we used regular concrete walls ( = 2.35 g/cm3) with
tenth value layers of 49.5 cm and 45 cm, for first and equilibrium tenth value layers respectively.
6. Secondary Barrier Remarks
Secondary barriers are impacted by secondary scatter and leakage. If the thickness of the barrier
is approximately the same for each secondary component (scatter and leakage), it is
recommended that 1 half value layer (HVL) is added to the larger of the two barrier thicknesses.
If the two thicknesses differ by a TVL or more, the larger thickness is used for the barrier. This is
referred to as the two source rule [3]. For our accelerator facility, the two components are
approximately the same, thus we used the larger and added 1 HVL to determine the shielding
thickness. For regular concrete, we determined [3] a HVL to be 15cm.
7. Neutron Considerations
Since the accelerator used in our shielding design is a 22 MV accelerator (above the binding
energy of nucleons), photon neutrons will be produced. Thus neutrons will also play a part in the
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shielding considerations. If the material used in the primary barrier is concrete, then the barrier
will absorb both the produced photoneutrons and neutron capture gamma rays, without the need
for additional barriers [3]. After considering this accepted guideline for primary barriers, we
extended the rule to all secondary barriers including the primary door which is predominantly
concrete. If a barrier is not concrete, further neutron considerations must be taken into account.
For our shielding analysis, this included the considerations for the control room door and neutron
generator cover.
8. Door and DT Generator Cover Calculations [4]
For areas that need to be shielded but require access like doors and conduits, concrete is
not the best material to used, because of the thicknesses or more importantly volumes required.
For these, a laminated barrier is typically used to allow for thinner shielding and to stop both the
incoming photon and neutron radiation.

Figure 3: Example of a laminated shielding door composed of lead,
polyethylene, and borated polyethylene (BPE). Shown in the figure is the
laminated door and additional strips of BPE and lead on the threshold to
shield against radiation that misses the laminated door [2].

For our project, we took this recommendation of materials and did a slight adaptation.
Instead of using lead, polyethylene, and borated polyethylene, we decided to use steel, lead, and
borated polyethylene. The steel was used to add structure. The high-Z metals (steel and lead)
were selected to create inelastic collisions with photoneutrons and provide photon attenuation.
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The borated polyethylene was used to slow and absorb the photoneutrons. The stacking of lead
and steel on both sides of the BPE was to: on the front, offer the inelastic neutron collisions and
incoming photon attenuation and on the back, offer additional photon attenuation from capture
gamma rays. Below is a breakdown of the control room door and neutron hole cover
calculations. Because of the similar TVL requirements, we elected to use the same material
thicknesses on each.

Control Room Door
Table 10: Secondary leakage
calculations for the control room
door
T
0.666667
W
1000
Gy/week
P
0.0001
Sv/week
20
Ft
dL
6.096
M
BL
0.005574
n
2.253819

Steel TVL = 11cm
Lead TVL = 5.5cm
Borated Polyethylene 5% (BPE) TVL = 8.5cm
Used thicknesses
Steel = 1.27cm and 2.54cm
Lead = 15.2cm
BPE = 30.5cm
Construction from back to front
Steel = 0.635cm
Lead = 7.6cm
BPE = 30.5cm
Lead = 7.6cm
Steel = 0.635cm
Surround Material (Top, bottom, and sides)
Steel = 2.54cm
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Threshold shielding strips
BPE = 5cm thick and 30cm wide (facing radiation area)
Lead = 5cm thick and 30cm wide (along inside of threshold)
Control Room Door Dimensions
8 feet tall x 6.5 feet wide x 1.54 feet thick
Or
2.44 m tall x 1.98 m wide x 0.47 m thick
Neutron Generator Cover
Table 11: Secondary scatter
calculations for the neutron hole
cover calculations
T
0.666667
W
1000
Gy/Week
P
0.0001
Sv/week
17
ft
Di
5.1816
m
A
6.1
m2
20
ft
Ds
6.096
m
Alpha
0.005
Bs
0.004943
N
2.306044

Steel TVL = 11cm
Lead TVL = 5.5cm
Borated Polyethylene 5% (BPE) TVL = 8.5cm
Used thicknesses
Steel = 1.27cm and 2.54cm
Lead = 15.2cm
BPE = 30.5cm
Construction from back to front
Steel = 0.635cm
Lead = 7.6cm
BPE = 30.5cm
Lead = 7.6cm
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Steel = 0.635cm
Surround Material (Top, bottom, and sides
Steel = 2.54cm
Threshold shielding strips
BPE = 5cm thick and 30cm wide (facing radiation area)
Lead = 5cm thick and 30cm wide (along inside of threshold)

Neutron Hole Cover Dimensions
3 feet tall x 3 feet wide x 1.54 feet thick (centered at 5 ft height)
Or
0.91 tall x 0.91 m wide x 0.47 m thick (centered at 5 ft height)

9. Wall Thicknesses
Wall thicknesses were determined based on the primary, scatter, and leakage calculations
recommended by the NCRP reports 144 and 151. These reports offer varied forms of equations,
constants, and tenth value layers. Thus there is some subjectivity to the actual calculations that
are used in each analytical solution. For our calculations, we justified the most reasonable
equations and constants (Equations 1-6) and tried to provide conservative estimates on factors
such as occupancy factor, workload, distance to interaction, etc. From the results of these
calculations and additional considerations such as the two source rule, we determined wall
thicknesses that were deemed suitable for use in the facility. Below is a to-scale representation of
the facility (Figure 4), labelled with relevant shielding areas, along with a compiled table of used
wall thicknesses (Table 12). For a larger to-scale drawing with dimensions, see Appendix b.
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Figure 4: Drafted geometry based on NCRP calculations with labelled walls.

Table 12: Finalized barrier thicknesses used in facility design
Wall ID and Description
Concrete Thickness
A. Primary Barrier
7ft / 2.13m
B. Hallway
3.1ft / 0.95m
3.5ft / 1.07m
C. Large Access Door
(0.635 cm steel surround)
D. Door Access Area
3ft / 0.91m
E. Outer Wall
3.8ft / 1.16m
F. Collimation Wall
3ft / 0.91m
G. Control Room
4.5ft / 1.37m
(Accelerator room)
H. Control Room
5ft / 1.52m
(Physical Security room)
I. Back Wall
2.5ft / 0.76m
(Accelerator room)
J. Back Wall (Control room)
3ft / 0.91m
K. Ceiling (not pictured)
5ft / 1.52m
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Figure 5: CAD renders of room geometry derived from NCRP analytical calculations that was used in
MCNP simulations

c. MCNP simulation of planned room design
i. MCNP geometry
From the dimensions determined from the NCRP analytical methods, a full-scale MCNP
geometry was created to perform particle simulations on. This allowed for a particle physics
based simulation based on individual geometry and materials to investigate dose rates at select
areas of the geometry based on the tallies and response functions that are chosen.
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Figure 6.1: Top view of MCNP geometry taken at 5 ft from the
floor of the facility, showing locations of tally cells
8

Figure 6.2: Side view of MCNP geometry taken parallel to the
photon beam conduit, showing the height of the floor tally cells
and the location of the ceiling tally cell.

ii. MCNP source term
To accurately obtain dose results, a representative source was developed. Instead of both
accelerator shielding group spending precious time developing the source term, the source term
was developed by our partner group Accelerator Shielding 1 and verified by both groups. Two
source terms were developed: one for photons produced by the 22 MeV electron beam from the
tungsten target and one for neutrons produced from the tungsten target.
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To start a 22 MeV electron beam was simulated on a 2 mm thick, 5 cm radius tungsten
disk. This size of target was chosen based on personal experience from viewing a tungsten target,
from contacting experts in the field about the size, and reading papers. This simple geometry was
set between two “infinite” planes. The two planes were tallied for both photons and neutrons,
creating energy and directional dependent distributions. These distributions were then used to
create two equivalent point charge source terms that are dependent on energy and direction.
Figures 7 and 8 show a visual representation of select energy groups for both source terms.

Figure 7: Source term representation for
21-22 MeV photons

26

Figure 8: Source term representation of
13-14 MeV neutrons
Two source terms were needed due to the high energy beam’s capability to produce
photoneutrons. For any beam energy above approximately 7 MeV (above the nuclear binding
energy), there is a chance of “knocking out” a neutron. Having both of these sources of primary
radiation and being able to track their journey along with any subsequent secondary radiation
allows for a representative simulation of the linear accelerator and physical security facilities.
Upon subsequent conversion, dose rates can be determined.
iii. MCNP dose conversion
For this project we were tasked with producing a floor plan that would shield the users
and public from radiation exceeding the limits set by governing regulatory bodies. In Tennessee,
the state governs the regulation or radiation dose limits. Regulatory dose limits are almost
exclusively given in dose equivalent rates (Sieverts/hour, Sieverts/week, Sieverts/year, etc.). To
get usable dose rates from MCNP to compare against regulatory limits, some type of data
manipulation must be made. This can be done in a number of different ways, utilizing dose
maps, anthropomorphic phantoms, or response functions. For our MCNP simulations, we chose
to set up tally cells and utilize response functions on the simulated volume averaged fluxes (F4).
Our tally cells were placed at high risk areas or the most probable points of failure. We
selected thirteen areas to tally. These were placed inside the irradiation area, in the hallway
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adjacent to the irradiation area (verifying wall B in Figure 4), behind the primary wall in line
with the neutron generator conduit (verifying wall A in Figure 4), beyond the large access door
(verifying door C in Figure 4), in the control room (verifying walls G and H in Figure 4, as well
as the control room door), and in the ceiling (verifying dose to occupants above are properly
shielded). From the tally results generated by these cells, we applied response functions taken
from ANS-6.1.1-1977 to get dose rates to compare against regulations [4]. To get accurate dose
rates we had to multiply each dose rate by a factor corresponding to electron beam intensity.
Based on simulations and judgement calls, we used two beam intensities corresponding to a low
and high estimate beam intensity for a reasonable min and max dose rate. It is important to say at
this point that these values are representative of a high powered beam. This beam will not be
used continuously, but for select, short irradiations.
Table 13: Neutron Flux-to-Dose rate conversion
factors for MCNP from ANSI/ANS 6.1.1-1977 [4]
Energy, E
DF(E)
Quality Factor
(MeV)
(rem/hr)(p/cm2-s)
2.5E–08
1.0E–07
1.0E–06
1.0E–05
1.0E–04
1.0E–03
1.0E–02
1.0E–01
5.0E–01
1
2
2.5
5
7
10
14
20

3.67E–06
3.67E–06
4.46E–06
4.54E–06
4.18E–06
3.76E–06
3.56E–06
2.17E–05
9.26E–05
1.32E–04
1.43E–04
1.25E–04
1.56E–04
1.47E–04
1.47E–04
2.08E–04
2.27E–04

2
2
2
2
2
2
2.5
7.5
11
11
9.3
9
8
7
6.5
7.5
8
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Table 14: Photon Flux-to-Dose rate conversion factors
for MCNP taken from ANSI/ANS 6.1.1-1977 [4]
Energy, E (MeV)
DF(E) (rem/hr)(p/cm2-s)
0.01
3.96E–06
0.03
5.82E–07
0.05
2.90E–07
0.07
2.58E–07
0.1
2.83E–07
0.15
3.79E–07
0.2
5.01E–07
0.25
6.31E–07
0.3
7.59E–07
0.35
8.78E–07
0.4
9.85E–07
0.45
1.08E–06
0.5
1.17E–06
0.55
1.27E–06
0.6
1.36E–06
0.65
1.44E–06
0.7
1.52E–06
0.8
1.68E–06
1
1.98E–06
1.4
2.51E–06
1.8
2.99E–06
2.2
3.42E–06
2.6
3.82E–06
2.8
4.01E–06
3.25
4.41E–06
3.75
4.83E–06
4.25
5.23E–06
4.75
5.60E–06
5
5.80E–06
5.25
6.01E–06
5.75
6.37E–06
6.25
6.74E–06
6.75
7.11E–06
7.5
7.66E–06
9
8.77E–06
11
1.03E–05
13
1.18E–05
15
1.33E–05
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Table 15: MCNP hourly dose rates corrected for beam intensity.

Area of interest numbers correspond to tally cell ID numbers
identified in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
Area of Interest
1. Critical Facility
2. Outside
3. Hallway
4. Mid Control Room
5. Left Control Room
6. Right Control Room
7. Accelerator Room
8. Ceiling

Low estimate for
MCNP dose rates
(mrem/hr)
9.48E-03
1.19E-02
1.98E-02
9.34E-05
7.09E-05
1.14E-04
1.77E+01
2.41E-04

High estimate for
MCNP dose rates
(mrem/hr)
7.96E+00
1.00E+01
1.66E+01
7.85E-02
5.95E-02
9.60E-02
1.48E+04
2.03E-01

Table 16: MCNP weekly dose rates corrected for weekly usage (40
hours/week) and area occupational factors.
Area of interest
1. Critical Facility
2. Outside
3. Hallway
4. Mid Control Room
5. Left Control Room
6. Right Control Room
7. Accelerator Room
8. Classes Above

IV.

Low estimate for
MCNP dose rates
(mSv/wk)
0.0023
0.0002
0.0016
0
0
0
4.7067
0.0001

High estimate for
MCNP dose rates
(mSv/wk)
1.9115
0.2
1.3271
0.0209
0.0159
0.0256
3952.7528
0.0811

Methods for Obtaining a Cost Estimate
Cost estimates on facilities are hard to determine based on: the uniqueness of the project,

cost of labor, materials, and possible changes proposed by experts and architects. However,
certain estimates can be made, specifically estimates based on the cost per volume of concrete
and costs of renting a crane, which would be required for construction. Radiation shielding
experts were also contacted to provide estimates for ventilation, possible labor costs, surveying,
and radiation monitors.
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Materials
Concrete = $160/m3
Approximate concrete volume = 1500 m3
Estimated cost = $240,000

Crane (75 Ton) = $200/hour + $700 travel

Large Direct Access Door = $200,000

HEPA ventilation = $14,000

Labor = $750,000
Health physics work
Certified health physicist = $125 /hr
Health physics technician = $60 /hr
Radiation area monitors = $50,000
Total health physics estimate = $75,000

Total Project Estimate
$1,500,000-$2,000,000

These prices are estimated costs Cost estimates were estimated through contacting
multiple resources, including: architects, shielding experts, medical physicists, and radiation
engineers. These are conservative estimates based on expertise in the field. In reality,
construction rates would be lumped into the cost of the entire engineering complex that would be
sent out and bid on by various construction firms.
V.

Summary and Conclusion
In the coming years, the nuclear engineering department will be expanding. A part of this

expansion is a proposed new building. This state-of-the-art building will incorporate multiple
research laboratories. Three of these laboratories include a linear accelerator facility, physical
security laboratory, and graphite pile/critical facility. The design of physical security laboratory
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and linear accelerator facility along with considerations regarding the affiliated critical facility is
described in this project report. For this design project, we have:


consulted faculty members about facility requirements



contacted professionals in the field about design considerations and methods



determined a viable facility layout



performed analytical calculations for shielding thicknesses using methods laid out
by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements reports 144
and 151



ran particle simulations of the source and geometry using MCNP



determined facility factors such as materials costs and auxiliary equipment.

From talks with faculty members about the function of the facility, design parameters
were determined. The design that was achieved allows for the utilization of two radiation
sources, a 22 MV linear accelerator and DT neutron generator. This was done to allow lower
energy radiation sources to be used such as the 9 MV accelerator planning to be used by the
department, while allowing for higher energy and more diverse radiation sources to be utilized in
the future. Also taken into consideration was the ability to bring in large objects in to the facility
through the large direct access door. The combined facilities (linear accelerator and physical
security) measures 35.8 ft x 64 ft including barriers and active floor space, not including the
large direct access door. The facility is designed with 20 ft ceilings set between a 5 ft thick
concrete ceiling and 10 ft thick concrete floor. The calculations for barrier thicknesses can be
found in section III.b.ii. The barriers that were calculated ranged from 2.8 ft to 7ft thick. The
method used to determine the shielding thicknesses takes into account various factors of the
facility: what is beyond the barrier, intensity of the beam, energy of the beam, distance to the
barrier, and the material of the barrier, to name a few [2,3]. From these calculations we established
a floorplan to use in our design. A detailed floor plan with dimensions can be seen in appendix b.
Visual representations of the facility can be seen throughout the report but namely in Figures 2
and 5.
From the established floorplan, an MCNP geometry was built including the correct
dimensions and materials (Figure 6). To accompany this representative geometry, a
representative source term was created to allow for an accurate particle simulation to be run
(Figures 7 and 8). After creation, the simulations were run tracking photons, photoneutrons, and
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neutron capture gamma rays, specifically their fluxes incident on tally cells. From the fluxes
recorded by the tally cells, conversions must be performed both during and after simulations.
Response functions were applied during simulation to convert fluxes to dose rates in mrem/hour.
After simulations, these dose rates were then weighted with source intensities to get
representative dose rates (Table 15). The minimum dose rates reported in this table all fall within
the regulatory hourly limit set by the State of Tennessee and the NRC [7] (2 mrem/hour for
uncontrolled areas and 10 mrem/hour for controlled areas). The maximum dose rates fall inside
the hourly dose rates for the most part, falling outside for the hallway and beyond the large direct
access door.
After hourly dose rates were determined, we converted the hourly dose rates into weekly
dose rates. This was done by first converting the mrem/hour into mSv/hour and then multiplying
by the work hours in a week and occupation factors for the various areas to be protected to get
weighted weekly dose rates (mSv/week). These dose rates can be seen in Table 16. According to
the governing bodies, the weekly dose rates limits are 0.02mSv/week for uncontrolled areas and
0.1 mSv/week for controlled areas. If you look at the high estimate for MCNP dose rate, several
areas are above regulatory limit. This estimate is based off a beam intensity that was higher than
used in our analytical calculations. If you look at the low estimate for MCNP dose rate, all areas
are below regulatory limit. In reality, the beam intensity would be between these two estimates,
falling within regulatory limits.
This deviation from regulatory limits using a high beam intensity estimate is expected. If
an accelerator ran at full power for a full business week, the necessary shielding would be
outrageous. A linear accelerator typically runs for short intervals with breaks in between. When
doing the first order analytical calculations, we were directed by the NCRP reports which give
conservative parameters relevant to medical linear accelerator facilities [2,3]. These parameters
were used because of a lack of parameters related directly to our facility. If the needs of the
faculty require for extended and consistent irradiation times, then a revised set of NCRP
calculations would need to be done given updated facility parameters. This increase in beam
intensity will result in thicker barriers.
Our facility design was created to be as user friendly as possible. Due to the size of the
facility, large scale as well as small scale experiments can be undertaken. Due to the shielding, a
high powered 22 MV accelerator can be used. With this high energy shielding taken into
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consideration, any lower energy accelerator could be used, specifically the 9 MV linear
accelerator that is intended to be included in the new nuclear engineering building. The facility
that was designed throughout the course of this project should easily meet the standards set by
the state of Tennessee and NRC given a moderate amount of use. It should also meet the needs
of the nuclear engineering department, as described by those faculty directly involved in the
daily usage of the facilities in question.
VI.

Future work
a. Neutron generator considerations
Along with the linear accelerator, the nuclear engineering department would like to add a

DT neutron generator. This neutron generator would allow for material’s damage to be
investigated along with neutron imaging to be performed. This additional radiation source would
increase the radiation fluence in and beyond the facility, thus more shielding would need to be
investigated. Due to time constraints within the project, this shielding was not investigated.
However, the placement of the radiation source was taken into account along with additional
room for shielding to be modified.
Due to the primary neutron source, the shielding would need to be of substantial
thickness to allow for the probability of interaction to increase. Additionally, the inclusion of a
high Z material on the surfaces of walls, such as a lead sheet, could aid in inducing inelastic
collisions. These inelastic collisions reduce the neutron’s energy, greatly reducing the amount of
needed shielding. For the purposes of this facility, we recommend adding lead sheets to the
inside of walls H and B in Figure 4 and adjusting wall thicknesses to shield the additional source
of radiation. Shielding will also need to be verified for the graphite pile/critical facility.
b. Faculty optimization
The facility that we have designed in the course of this project was a best guess estimate
based on the faculty design (Figure 1) and talks with faculty members about individual desires
for the design of the facilities. These individual desires include the large direct access door, high
ceilings, collimation wall, large imaging array, dual radiation sources, and the option to utilize a
higher energy linear accelerator.
Throughout the course of the project, desires changed and new desires came to light. We
did our best to accommodate all of these design parameters; however, it would be necessary for
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the faculty to identify all of the parameters that the facility must satisfy and adjust the design to
fit these needs.
c. Auxiliary Equipment and Considerations
i. Ventilation
A high power linear accelerator can produce many toxic and radioactive gases (13N, 15O,
ozone, nitric oxide, nitrogen dioxide, nitrogen trioxide, etc.) while running routinely in pure
oxygen. The higher the power of the linear accelerator the more these gases will be produced.
Thus, the ventilation system should be designed for a 22 MV accelerator. Ozone (O3) has the
greatest concern of hazard due to it being the most toxic and it reacts with nitric acid to form
oxides of nitrogen which can corrode the equipment in the linear accelerator facility or the linear
accelerator itself. Ozone has a production rate of 13 molecules per 100 eV [8]. Due to these
effects, it is important to have a proper ventilation and monitoring system to discharge these
gases. The ventilation system should use labyrinth ventilator pipelines, which provides
continuous ventilation for the ozone being produced. Lastly, the concentration of these gases
inside the facility should be monitored in the control room to guarantee a safe environment to the
radiological workers entering the linear accelerator room [8,9].
ii. Cabling
Cabling is a necessity in any research facility to support the machines and measurement
equipment. Due to the amount of cabling and the need for occupational safety, cables must be
managed. This is usually done with either a cable ditch dug into the floor and covered, cable
ducts, cable tray attached to the ceiling, or through temporary covers [9].
iii. Temperature and humidity
The linear accelerator and physical security rooms must be maintained between 5C and
35C and below a maximum 90% humidity (information corresponds to 15MV Varian Linatron
K15) [10]. This is done so that the linear accelerator and affiliated equipment, such as the power
supply, do not get overheated or too wet. For the purpose of these facilities and their direct
access to the outside an air conditioner, heater, and dehumidifier are all going to be needed [9].
iv. Other factors to be considered
Beyond these more general concerns needed for the operation of any linear accelerator
facility, specific factors must be addressed for each individual facility including: safety
interlocks, power requirements, lighting system, crane, amongst others [9]. These factors are
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dependent on: the type of linear accelerator selected, the size of the finalized facility, the
geometry of the finalized facility. Due to time constraints and the possibility that the room layout
will change with further faculty optimization and shielding verification, we have elected to not
go into detail in these systems but mention the necessity for considering them in any future
design modification.
d. Shielding verification
In the event that this design is considered for use or adapted for use in the plan of the
proposed nuclear engineering building, a shielding professional would need to be commissioned
to perform a shielding calculation to verify and correct shielding dimensions. These calculations
and verifications could be undertaken by departmental faculty adept in shielding, adjunct
medical physics faculty that have shielding experience, or shielding venders.
e. Architectural modification
Where a normal building would need to take into account the expertise of one specialty, a
radiation facility must take into account multiple to account for the design, functionality, and
safety. At the time of design by the architect, there needs to be considerable cooperation between
the shielding expert commissioned to undertake the shielding verification and the architect
commissioned to design the building. Each of these professionals is concerned with different
aspects of a building design. The shielding professional is concerned with the functionality of the
building, namely the ease of use and the effectiveness of the shielding. Whereas the architect is
concerned with the aesthetics and flow of the building. If changes are made to the room layout
that does not directly follow the shielding verified by the expert, there will be a possibility that
the shielding is insufficient. For instance, if a wall is pulled closer to the source without adjusting
the shielding, the radiation transmission will be greater due to radiation’s

1
𝑟2

dose fall off. To

achieve an effective design, both must be consulted about any changes that each needs to make.
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b. Large Floor Plan with Dimensions
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